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RECENT DECISIONS
Church and State: Prayer in Public Schools-The State Board of
Regents of New York recommended that the following prayer be said
aloud by each public school class in the presence of a teacher at the start
of every school day:
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and
our country.
The Board of Education of New Hyde Park, New York, adopted this
suggested procedure, and the parents of ten pupils challenged its con-
stitutionality on the ground that this governmental encouragement of
prayer violates the First Amendment's command that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion," this having been
made applicable to the State of New York by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Both the trial court' and the New York Court of Appeals2 upheld
the power of New York to install the Regents' prayer as part of the
daily procedure in the public schools, as long as it remained wholly
voluntary. All students were given the option of either joining in, ab-
senting themselves from, or remaining silent during, the recitation of
this prayer. In addition, the parents were advised of the nature of the
prayer and of the privilege of having their children excused.
The United States Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, held,
in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Black, that New York's use of this
prayer was inconsistent with the Establishment of Religion Clause of
the First Amendment, Engel v. Vitale.3 Justice Black discarded the argu-
ments involving the Free Exercise Clause and based his opinion solely
on an interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause:
Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally
neutral, nor the fact that its observance on the part of the stu-
dents is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the
Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment . 4
It is, therefore, only necessary for us to examine the Court's application
of the Establishment Clause to this fact situation.
While Justice Black's brief review of the history of the Establish-
ment Clause is quite accurate, this does not justify his conclusions:
The New York laws officially prescribing the Regents' prayer
are inconsistent with both the purposes of the Establishment
Clause and with the Establishment Clause itself.5
IEngel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 191 N.Y.S. 2d 453 (1959).
2 Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y. 2d 174, 176 N.E. 2d 579 (1960).
3 Engel v. Vitale, 82 S. Ct. 1261 (1961).
4 Ibid. at 1263.
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No doubt Justice Black is correct in asserting that the Framers were
opposed to and outlawed the establishment of a tax-supported church
similar to the Church of England. It is also obvious that they clearly
denied all governments the power to originate anything comparable to
the Book of Common Prayer.6 These facts in no way indicate that the
Framers also opposed and intended to prohibit, through the First
Amendment, nondenominational and non-compulsory prayers such as
the Regents' prayer. The intense opposition to the practice of establish-
ing a religion by law which culminated in the enactment by our founders
of the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty also sheds no light on this
case. That document merely placed all religious groups "on equal footing
so far as the State was concerned,"'7 and in no way indicates opposition
to nondenominational prayer. Finally, none of the fears against which
Justice Black felt the Framers leveled at the First Amendment have
been realized by New York's use of the Regents' prayer (e.g. "govern-
ment program to further certain religious beliefs"; "Government's
placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer
or one particular form of religious services"; "the same authority which
can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may ...
establish any particular sect"8 ).
The Court holds that "New York's state prayer program officially
establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer," but
the opinion fails to logically reconcile this with many other governmental
practices accepted as part of our spiritual traditions9 Why do not the
invocations before court sessions, daily prayers in Congress, student
singing of our National Anthem, student recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance (containing the words "one Nation under God. . ."), Presi-
dential proclamations of a National Day of Prayer, and the impression
of the words "In God We Trust" on our coins, officially establish the
religious beliefs imbodied therein? The court fails to distinguish these
and many other such examples when it claims that the Regents' prayer,
as used by New York's school system, establishes a state religion.
Justice Black has misinterpreted these few words of acknowledgment
of our Creator as being "religious education."
But it is not "religious education" nor is it the practice of or
establishment of religion in any reasonable meaning of those
phrases. Say this simple prayer may be, according to the broadest
5 Supra note 3, at 1268.
s This was a denominational book, enacted by Parliament which contained the
form and content of prayer and other religious ceremonies to be used in the
State Church.
7Supra note 3, at 1266.8 Supra note 3.
9 The Court does, in footnote 22, simply state, without any further explanation,




possible dictionary definition, an act of "religion," but when the
Founding Fathers prohibited an "establishment of religion," they
were referring to official adoption of, or favor to, one or more
sects.10
In seeking to ascertain the meaning of any constitutional provision,
the intent of the framers must be considered. The proper interpretation
of the Establishment Clause is only possible through an examination of
the religious beliefs, attitudes toward public prayer, educational prac-
tices, and governmental practices common when the First Amendment
was adopted. That is to say, we must interpret the Clause in light of our
knowledge, obtained from objective historical facts, of the kind of men
who wrote and adopted it. In examining the available historical data,
our purpose is to discover the concepts which lay behind the actual
wording used by the framers. Certainly, this purpose is not to be
achieved by the often used technical or grammatical11 analyzation of
the wording of the constitutional provision, but rather by looking to the
thought behind it.
A brief look at the documents relating to the formation of the
United States, as well as the surroundings and character of the framers
renders it inconceivable that they would have written into their Con-
stitution a clause purporting to eliminate all religious content from pub-
lic institutions. The following give eloquent testimony of the religious
convictions of the founding fathers and of their belief in the propriety
of preserving our religious tradition in public activities. The Declara-
tion of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms includes: "...
[T]he divine Author of our existence . . ." and ".... [R]everence for
our great Creator." 12 The Declaration of Independence mentioned both
"God-given rights" and the fact that God is the source of all human
rights. The Articles of Confederation included an invocation of the
"Great Governor 6f the World." Thomas Jefferson, the one often re-
ferred to as opposing most strenuously the union of church and state,
wrote: "Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have
removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people
that these liberties are a gift of God."' 3 John Adams, who represented
Jefferson's political opponents, held the same views: "Our Constitution
was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate
to the government of any other."'14
In attempting to determine whether James Madison and Thomas
10 Supra note 2, at 581.11 By "technical or grammatical," I am referring to the play on word definitions,
out of context quoting of certain passages, and indiscriminate varying of li-
teral and figurative interpretations which all result in disputes as to form
rather than intended thought content.
121 JOURNAL OF CONGRESS 1, 134-39 (1800 ed).
13 8 WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 404 (Washington ed. 1853-4).
149 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAms 229.
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Jefferson intended, by the First Amendment, to abolish all vestiges of
God from our public school system, we are faced with the fact that no
such system existed during their lifetime. The closest they came to con-
sidering a public school system was Jefferson's proposed Virginia
School Bill of 1817 which set up a system of free, tax-supported pri-
mary schools under local supervision in each county.15 The Bill itself
recognized and allowed for the possibility of some simple nondenomina-
tional recognition of God in the schools. It therefore seems probable
that, were Jefferson alive today, he would refute any contention that the
First Amendment requires a compulsory exclusion from our whole
public educational system of all voluntary mention of God or of that
dependence upon Him which Jefferson himself acknowledged in the
Declaration of Independence.
The actions of the First Congress also indicate the feelings of the
framers with respect to the proper place of religious tradition in our
public institutions and in education generally. The Northwest Ordinance
of 1787 states: "Religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary to
good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means
of education shall be forever encouraged."'16 To hold that the purpose of
the Establishment Clause was to prevent any "union of government
and religion,"' 7 is to say that the Congress, composed of the very men
who had drafted, debated and voted on the First Amendment, immedi-
ately violated it by passing statutes such as those authorizing chaplains
for the legislature which obviously prefer believers over non-believers
and aid the general cause of religion.
"The prime purpose of the clause [Establishment Clause] as then
[time of adoptiQn] universally understood, was to prohibit the Congress
from creating a national church or from giving any sect a preferred
status.""' This is made even clearer by a consideration of the original
draft of the First Amendment submitted by James Madison:
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of re-
ligious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be estab-
lished, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in
any manner or on any pretext infringed.19
It is obvious that no national church or preference to a certain sect has
resulted from the adoption of the Regents' prayer. This being so, the
provisions of the First Amendment, interpreted according to the his-
torical intendment of the framers, have in no way been violated.
15 RAY J. HONEYWELL, THE EDUCATIONAL WORK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 235 (Har-
vard Univ. Press 1931).
16 1 Stat. 51-52.
17Supra note 3, at 1267.
1s Legal Dept. of the Nat'l. Catholic Welfare Conference, "The Constitutionality
of the Inclusion of Church-related Schools in Federal Aid to Education," 50
GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 399, 413.
19 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789-91).
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Even the Court's previous interpretations of the First Amendment
do not lead to a prohibition of New York's action here. The McCollum
case,20 which held unconstitutional a "released time program," is easily
distinguished from this case in that the core of that program was formal
sectarian instruction of public school pupils in the schools during class
hours. The Regents' prayer is not sectarian instruction of any kind and
is in full accord with the heritage and traditions of our people. Some
may not accept that heritage as a matter of right, but they have no right
to compel others to ignore or be deprived of it. "Every individual has
a Constitutional right to be free from religion, but that right is a shield,
not a sword, and may not be used to compel others to adopt the same
attitude." 21 The Court has here ignored its own well reasoned position
expressed in the Zorach case:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one
chooses.... When the state encourages religious authorities by
adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it
follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the re-
ligious nature of our people and accommodates the public service
to their spiritual needs. 22
New York's use of the Regents' prayer does not fall within the pro-
hibition of the Establishment Clause as intended by the framers; is a
proper reflection of our spiritual tradition antedating the ratification of
the Constitution; and, is clearly within the area of permissible accom-
modation recognized in the Zorach case.
JAMES F. JANZ
Civil Rights: Discrimination in Private Housing-A Massachu-
setts statute' provides that no owner or managing agent of a multiple
dwelling or contiguously located housing accommodations may refuse
to rent or lease to any person on account of his race, creed, color or
national origin. As defined by the statute, "multiple dwelling" means
"... a dwelling which is usually occupied for permanent residence pur-
poses and which is either rented, leased, let or hired out, to be occupied
as the residence or home of three or more families living independently
of each other...."
Complainant, a Negro, sought to rent an apartment in a large private
apartment building, but was refused. No government assistance was
involved. He then registered a complaint with the Massachusetts Com-
mission Against Discrimination, the administrative agency charged with
the enforcement responsibility. After a formal hearing, the commission
found the respondents had engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices
2 0 McCollu v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).2 1 Supra note 2, at 487.
22 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-14 (1952).
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